It's reported that former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has returned to his original career as a college professor of civil engineering, and what's more, he rides the bus to work daily,

The fact that 78-year-old former Iranian President (and former just about everything else) Hashemi-Rafsanjani has again thrown his turban into the ring, and that a key backer of outgoing President Ahmadinejad also registered for the Presidential elections at the eleventh hour, could make for an interesting election this summer — but not necessarily. The Guardians Council has yet to vet the candidates and may cut several. Assuming Rafsanjani's credentials are solid enough to stay in the race, his page, his past record, and his defeat in 2005 by Ahmadinejad when he last attempted a comeback suggest that we should not put too much weight on the likelihood of his returning to power. (It also says something about Iran's ideological evolution that this one time right-hand-man to Ruhollah Khomeini is being billed as the reformist candidate.

Rafsanjani is better known than most of the candidates, but a number of them (Ali Akbar Velayati, Saeed Jalili, Ali Baqer Qalibaf) have widespread name recognition, and Qalibaf was apparently popular as Tehran Mayor. Ahmadinejad ally Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei was another late entry. As a result, the field includes most of the political spectrum that the regime allows to function politically. But Rafsanjani may have dissuaded others on the reformist wing from standing.

The aftermath of the 2009 elections and the birth of the Green movement still evoke some bitterness. Will these elections be viewed as fair? Of course, it's a loaded question given the Council of Guardians' ability to disqualify candidates.

Here is a selection of other voices:

uzanne Maloney of Brookings: "And They’re Off: The Campaign for a New Iranian President Has Begun." 

Mohammed Ali Shabani at Al-Monitor: "Rafsanjani Registers for High-Stakes Presidential Election."

Farideh Farhi: "Iran Surprises Again."

Gary Sick: "What Just Happened in Iran?"

Barbara Slavin at Al-Monitor: "Don't Get Too Excited Over Rafsanjani's Run."

Comforting Hugo Chavez' Mother

For a term-limited guy with only limited friends abroad and not many more at the moment at home, the photo of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad embracing Hugo Chavez' mother at the Venezuelan President's funeral should have seemed like a nice touch showing the Iranian President's human side.

But no: needless to say, hardline clerics denounced him; it's haram to embrace an unrelated woman unless she's drowning, say the clerics. As Robert Mackey notes at the New York Times' The Lede blog, his own supporters quickly claimed it was a sinister Photoshop by the Western media. But the photos they produced as the "real" ones were clear Photoshops, while the photo at left was from Venezuelan media, not Western, and there's video that appears to show the same thing.

So the one moment that might have given him a human side in Western eyes is being strenuously if unconvincingly denied. If  there's some kind of international prize for being hoist by your own PR, Ahmadinejad should win.

Methinks the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar is not amused ...

I already noted that President Ahmadinejad's visit to Egypt was encountering some rough spots. Well, while visiting the Sayyidna Hussein mosque (a Fatimid foundation honoring a Shi‘ite imam, though Egypt's small Shi‘ite community cannot hold services there), a man described as a Syrian attacked the Iranian President with a shoe, apparently for Iran's support of the Syrian regime. He's in custody.

This Turkish news agency clip isn't terribly clear, but it captures the moment:

For the first time since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, an Iranian President is in Cairo. Mahmud Ahmadinejad has already met with President Morsi and the Sheikh al-Azhar, and thus is ending years of open hostility, suspended relations, and mutual exchanges of accusations. Everyone is calling it a historic visit  and, of course, it is, in that no Iranian leader since the Shah has been welcome in Egypt.

But despite diplomatic niceties, this is no massive geopolitical shift. The Iranian Preaident is getting lectured about Syria by both Morsi and the Sheikh al-Azhar, warned against adventurism in the Gulf, and told not to try to spread Shi‘ism in the Arab world. (It hasn't been reported whether Ahmadinejad has brought up the plight of Egypt's small Shi‘ite population.)

Meanwhile Morsi is getting flak from the Salafis, who apparently consider any fraternization with a known Shi‘ite to be beyond the pale.

And let's not make too much of this "breakthrough": Ahmadinejad is there for an Islamic Summit Egypt is hosting, so it's not exactly Nixon going to China. And of course, he's term-limited, will be leaving office later this year, and has been engaged in a running battle with the Iranian Parliament, so he's not exactly dealing from a position of strength. (But then, of course, neither is Morsi.)

As a reminder of better times in Egyptian-Iranian relations: here's a 1939 photo of King Farouq with then-Iranian Crown Prince (later Shah) Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, visiting the Delta prior to the future Shah's marriage to the King's sister.

Then again, the Shah later divorced her.

Real BBC headline: "Iran's President Ahmadinejad Offers to Go Into Space."

Real photo caption: "President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (right) met the monkey that Iran says it sent into space last week."

No ... wisecracks here would be just too easy. I'm not going there. You're on your own.

Even before Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his speech to the UN General Assembly, Amin Azad's guest post at Juan Cole's blog pretty much called it: "Has-Been, Lame Duck Ahmadinejad's UN Speech is Empty Mugging for the Camera." 

Ahmadinejad not only will be finishing up his second term, but there's even talk of abolishing the office of President. Ahmadinejad may be enjoying his last moment in the limelight, though as Azad notes:

If nothing extraordinary happens between now and the end of his presidency, the best fate that Ahmadinejad can hope for is to return to teaching civil engineering (his specialty is traffic engineering) at university. One thing, however, could change things for him dramatically, keeping him in the limelight and guaranteeing him a prominent political role well into the future: an Israeli attack on Iran. In such a case, all the Iranian leaders will forget their political differences and form a united front against aggression.

Ahmadinejad's speech today was not his only limelight, as he also gave a number of media interviews. Why, if his influence at home is on the wane? I think part of it is the need to find news in the ceremonial parade of speakers that is General Assembly week.  And, of course, the fact that the US media usually has to go to Iran to interview Ahmadi, and now he's coming to them.

Egyptian President Morsi's UN debut is today's other news, but no one expected Morsi to make huge headlines. For Ahmadinejad, the news seems that he didn't say anything too outrageous about Israel. His last appearance before the General Assembly seems to have been an anticlimax.

But Ahmadinejad was never known particularly for bizarre General Assembly behavior. The late (and otherwise unlamented) Libyan leader Mu‘ammar Qadhafi was unsurpassed in his ability to, well, do whatever it was he did. If you miss the unpredictability, go back three years to this post of mine from 2009: "Qadhafi on Taliban, Vatican, US Civil War, Saving Humanity, etc., etc." 

And believe me, there is a lot in each of those "etc."s. Qadhafi stretched his 15 minutes to 95 minutes and the simultaneous translator gave up at one point. Ahmadinejad never came close.

President Ahmadinejad, we remember Qadhafi. We listened to Qadhafi (and listened, and listened). And Mr. President, you're no Mu‘ammar Qadhafi.

A simmering dispute between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, ‘Ali Khamene'i, peaked today when the Supreme Leader issued a statement insisting that Ahmadinejad must retain Minister of Information (Intelligence) Heydar Moslehi, who had submitted his resignation in a dispute with Ahmadinejad and the latter had accepted it.

The Supreme Leader has the final say over security ministries, and if Ahmadinejad were to resist the order to restore Moslehi it could provoke a crisis.

The firing yesterday of Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki remains a somewhat mysterious, if obviously important, event, as does his replacement by ‘Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the nuclear program. (Pics at left: Mottaki on top, then Salehi.) It appears to be a power play by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, and may be an indication of deep divisions in the senior leadership.

What follows blends some of my own thoughts with some online discussions which, being off the record, I cannot cite; I will only say I hope it's informed by the views of some who know Iran much better than I.

Observation Number One: It may be as sign that Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene'i, who has the ultimate say over key positions like the Foreign Ministry, may indeed be seriously ill and his powers fading. If seems likely it's an attempt by the hardliners to emphasize the centrality of the nuclear issue.

Observation Number Two: Mottaki was fired while on an official visit to Senegal. Firing your Foreign Minister while he's on an official visit seems to suggest either a quick decision or a deliberate attempt to isolate him while outside the country. It certainly suggests more than a routine reshuffle: more an open repudiation.

Observation Number Three: Some accounts suggest that ‘Ali Akbar Salehi, the interim Foreign Minister and head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, may in his latter capacity be banned by the UN sanctions from freely traveling internationally. A Foreign Minister who may be barred from travel?

Observation Number Four: Salehi, who despite the concerns cited above, has a Bachelor's from AUB and a doctorate from MIT (trained back in the 70s when the US was assisting Iran in training nuclear engineers), is said to have the best English of anyone in senior leadership. So he might otherwise be a strong candidate.

Observation Number Five: There have been claims that Mottaki frequently quarreled with Ahmadinejad, who may have blamed him for sanctions and other international setbacks Iran has suffered, even if most were responses to Ahmadinejad's policies, not Mottaki's.

More when (and if) we know more.

Ahmadinejad did Beirut yesterday, and Qana and Bint Jbeil and then Beirut again today, and now is heading home.

A couple of other perspectives: Qifa Nabki, always worth reading, suggests that whle this has beren portrayed as a boost for Hizbullah, it may be that Ahmadinejad owes more to Hasan Nasrullah than the other way around.

And a colleague who asks for anonymity writes:

In the final instance Ahmadinejad's trip to Lebanon is more about weakness than strength. Both his own and Hizbullah's.His visit is a warning to domestic opponents not to press Hizbullah. Presumably on the STL issue, which has the potential to do great damage to its reputation and standing. It also serves to rally supporters by demonstrating that the party has a powerful external friend who can help Hizbullah weather any storm. Even one so severe as the STL will cause.

If Hizbullah were strong enough or confident enough in its position, it wouldn't need the visit.

The fact that this visit is likely to damage Hizbullah allies - the FPM or Tashnaq for example, supports this view. Their constituencies may well be unsettled by the fear of greater Iranian influence in the country. And it may be harder to mobilize their existing partisans for elections and to attract new voters to their banners. The parties of the so-called majority will no doubt mine many useful campaign images from the visit.

Hizbullah knows that. But it is sacrificing its allies' strategic position for its own.

As to Ahmadinejad, he is playing the "foreign card" to buttress his support back home, especially among the hard liners.

Wrapping himself in the mantle of resistance by a visit to the capital of the resistance, Bint Jbeil. Perhaps followed by a symbolic rami al jamaraat at the border.

As well, his visit breaks the sanctions blockade. Scenes of welcoming crowds prove that the West has failed. Iran is not isolated. Showered by foreign crowds with roses and cheers, he stands for Iran.

Guide for the perplexed: The FPM is Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement; Tashnaq is an Armenian nationalist movement: both are Christian political allies of Hizbullah. Rami al-Jamaraat refers to throwing stones at the devil during the Meccan pilgrimage, and refers to talk Ahmadinejad might throw some symbolic stones at the Israeli border; I don't think he got closer than Bint Jbeil, though.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visit to Lebanon, long awaited/feared depending on one's faction, is under way. Coming at a moment when a confrontation between Hizbullah and the government over the Special Trbunal for Lebanon is looming, it's clearly a great propaganda ploy for Hizbullah.

Rami Khouri in The Daily Star offers an insightful analysis. Hizbullah's Al-Manar is bubbling over the visit, leading practically every regional category (including "Zionist Entity") with the visit. Lebanese bloggers, on the other hand, have been fairly witty about the whole thing; Beirut Spring shows an AP photo and comments "We have our priorities right in this country":

(Via The Arabist)

Seriously, though, this is a serious power move, a signal that Hizbullah does not stand alone, confirming that this is a tough and dangerous time for he fragile stability of the Lebanese system, still, as Michael Hudson labeled it decades ago, a Precarious Republic.

I'd been wondering whether to post anything about the various reports suggesting that there were back-channel contacts between the US and Iran, trying to feel out a possible rapprochement. Despite a fair amount of such speculation ahead of the General Assembly, I think Ahmadinejad's rant about September 11 being staged by the US, the evils of the US, capitalism, etc., and the US walkout essentially amount to: Never mind.

At least this year Ahmadinejad could claim the award for ranting from the podium: last year, of course, he was outstaged by Qadhafi's hour and a half stream-of-consciousness happening. Brother Leader isn't coming this year.

Ahmadinejad may have aspirations, but Qadhafi's still the master of the art.

There are conflicting reports about an alleged grenade attack on Mahmud Ahmadinejad's motorcade in Hamadan, with Al-Arabiya and other reports claiming it was a grenade, and Iranian official media, after some confusion, saying it was only a firecracker. Interesting, though I doubt if we'll hear much more.

You know you want to. (For the robot, see yesterday.)

The US, Britain and France walked out during Mahmod Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN nonproliferation conference. More here.

Think what you will about Iran, but it's clear the regime is determined to defend its program as peaceful (despite evidence to the contrary) by hanging tough, not to say grandstanding. Ahmadinejad will strike a chord, I suspect, with other countries not entirely happy that the NPT regime sometimes looks like an oligarchic club. His decision to attend — no other heads of state are coming — was itself grandstanding, but what could the UN do? If they said no, he'd claim Iran was not being allowed to defend itself.

The NPT was signed in 1968, much closer in time to Hiroshima than to today. The fact that four non-signatories have nuclear weapons suggest it has not been as successful as one might hope; Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea have not suffered severely from going nuclear outside the NPT framework, though in the North Korean case it has suffered sanctions. I certainly am not eager to see more proliferation, especially if Iran is the proliferator, but I do find it interesting that Iran is defending its program so fiercely.

I didn't post anything about the much reported meeting of Presidents Bashar al-Asad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah in Damascus. Since it seems to have come at a time of warming US-Syrian relations it struck some as unusual (plus the fact that Nasrallah, not President Suleiman of Lebanon, was accorded equality with the two heads of state).

Rather than punditize myself let me refer you to the commentaries collected by Josh Landis at Syria Comment. Also see Qifa Nabki's comments on the matter. They pontificate well, so I don't have to.

And for a different perspective, this from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Added: Don't forget Twitter, the key Iranian communications medium last summer. #22 Bahman is probably the most important, but #bahman, #iran, #iranelection, .and others are worth following. I'm sure there's going to be a lot of Facebook traffic too.

We're still snowed in and the Federal Government is closed again tomorrow. I'll keep blogging, however.

Since tomorrow is the big celebration of the Revolution and the day of expected confrontations in Tehran, and since the government is threatening some very serious crackdowns, I thought I'd point you to some on-the-eve pieces at Tehran Bureau, at The Daily Beast, and at Enduring America. These are sites that, from varying perspectives, have followed the opposition movement closely. I'll be posting my own reactions tomorrow as well, but they will be devoting more time to it than most.

Iranian President Ahmadinejad's recent announcement that Iran will begin enriching uranium to 20% has gotten a lot of attention, but is it really aimed at domestic consumption on the eve of the big February 11 Victory Day celebrations/confrontations? The Green opposition forces are ramping up for another round of demonstrations and the Guards Corps and Basij are bracing for a crackdown. Reza Aslan says it's for domestic consumption and calls Iran's announcements "a joke" given its problems enriching to five percent. And Juan Cole has a quote from ‘Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, that suggests this is a negotiating position to persuade the West to accept Iran's terms, rather than a new level of confrontation.

This is a tense week in Iran due to the internal pressures as the holiday approaches; certainly I'd rather they didn't mix in nuclear brinksmanship, but I thought it worth calling these alternative interpretations to your attention.

I thought I'd add a bit to what I said in my previous post about the period February 1-11 in 1979 and in Iranian practice since. Known as the "ten days of Fajr" (dawn) in Revolutionary parlance, they were marked by a rapid transformation of the situation and the utter collapse of what remained of the Pahlavi regime.

You can find a timeline here. The Shah left the country January 16. He had previously appointed Shapour Bakhtiar as a reformist Prime Minister. Bakhtiar sought to keep a reformist but non-Islamist government in power, but had little choice but to agree to allow Khomeini to return from exile.

The arrival of Khomeini on February 1 was the catalyst for one of the Middle East's true revolutions — as opposed to classic military coups that are officially proclaimed "revolutions" — and things moved swiftly.

On February 4, Khomeini named his own Prime Minister: Mehdi Bazargan. A former aide to Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, Bazargan was a liberal reformer. From the fourth, there were two rival PMs, Bazargan and Bakhtiar.

On the ninth of February, fighting broke out between the Imperial Guard and Air Force units loyal to Khomeini. On the 10th, there were further clashes and Bakhtiar proclaimed martial law; Khomeini ordered his followers to ignore it. On the next day, the military declared its neturality and the last semblances of the Bakhtiar regime collapsed. February 11 is celebrated as Victory Day, the pinnacle of the ten days of Fajr. The long progression of revolutionary turmoil began, with several non-clerical figures replacing each other in office until, after the beginning of the hostage crisis later that year, the Constitution of the modern Islamic Republic was put in place.

I need hardly point out that the symbolism of the 1979 events are very much in the minds of the regime and of the opposition, since opposition leaders such as Mir-Hossein Moussavi were very much a part of all this. In a way the two sides today are each trying to claim the legacy of the Revolution. It could be a tense ten days, especially now that Ahmadinejad has promised that Iran "will deliver a harsh blow to the Global Arrogance" on February 11. That seems to be revolutionary rhetoric, but a regime on the defensive at home might make a miscalculation internationally.